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NOTES
LABOR LAW: DAMAGE SUITS AS A MEANS
OF CONTROLLING UNION UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UNDER THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
The Supreme Court has recently handed down two decisions which
may result in damage suits becoming a significant method of restrain-
ing improper union conduct. The question in each case was whether
a state court could award damages to the person injured by the
wrongful action of a labor union where that conduct could also be
deemed an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act).' In International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Gonzales2 a union member, claiming expulsion from the
union in violation of its by-laws and constitution, brought suit in
equity for reinstatement and damages resulting from breach of the
contractual relationship between the union and its member.3 In
International Union, United Automobile Workers (UAW-CIO) v.
Russell' a non-union employee who was prevented from working by
mass picketing brought an action for damages against the union for
its wrongful interference with his lawful occupation. The Supreme
Court in each instance, even though it assumed that the union had
been guilty of an unfair labor practice for which the injured party
might have obtained similar relief from the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB),5 held that the state court had jurisdiction to
award damages for the wrongful conduct of the labor union. The
dissent" argued in each case that Congress by enacting labor legis-
lation had precluded a state court from exercising jurisdiction over
conduct that is an unfair labor practice.
1. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1952). Unfair labor practices
are prohibited by § 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act. See 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1952).
2. 356 U.S. 617 (1958), affirming 142 Cal. App. 2d 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1956).
3. Under California law membership in a labor union constitutes a contract
between the union and the member, and a breach of this contract is redressible in
damages. 356 U.S. at 618.
4. 356 U.S. 634 (1958), affirming 264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d 175 (1956).
5. Upon a finding that the employer has committed an unfair labor prac-
tice, the NLRB may order an employee reinstated with back pay if the policies
of the Taft-Hartley Act would be effectuated thereby. See 61 Stat. 147 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952).
6. To each case Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas dissented. Justice
Black took no part in either decision.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The basic question raised by these decisions is whether persons
seeking to restrain union unfair labor practices may now do so by an
action for damages in a state court. To answer this question, it is
necessary to look closely at those decisions in which the Supreme
Court has denied state court jurisdiction over unfair labor practices.
Against this background the importance of the two principal cases
can be assessed in terms of the question posed.
Acts of Congress are specifically declared to be the "supreme law
of the land."'7 Absent legislative intent to the contrary, the Supreme
Court has frequently held that, to the extent that Congress has legis-
lated with regard to a specific activity, states are deprived of juris-
diction to act in the same area.8 State action to be valid must not con-
flict with the purposes of federal legislation.9 This is the doctrine of
pre-emption.1O
In the field of labor relations the Supreme Court has applied this
doctrine to hold, generally, that states may not interfere with rights
protected by federal law,11 and may not enjoin conduct which Con-
gress has declared to be an unfair labor practice.12 In terms of pre-
emption, the first of these propositions has presented the Court with
little difficulty; the second, however, has proved more vexing. In
Garner v. Teamsters Union (AFL)13 an employer who had been the
victim of peaceful but coercive picketing for union recognition, an
unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act, obtained an in-
junction from a Pennsylvania court on the ground that the union had
violated the state labor act.14 On review the Supreme Court, noting
7. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) early gave vitality
to the supremacy clause.
8. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333
U.S. 445 (1948); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
9. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
10. The doctrine of pre-emption with regard to federal labor relations has
been a frequent subject for writers. See, e.g., Cox, Federalism in the Law of
Labor Relations, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1297 (1954); Isaacson, Federal Pre-emption
under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 391 (1958); Smith, The
Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 46 Mich. L. Rev.
593 (1948).
11. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). But state action pursuant to its
police power is not pre-empted by federal law unless the intention of Congress
to do so is clearly manifested. See note 20 infra.
12. Garner v. Teamsters Union (AFL), 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
13. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
14. The state equity court's opinion is reported at 62 Dauph. Co. Rep. 339
(1951). The injunction was later reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
See 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953).
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that the provisions of the state and federal statutes concerning unfair
labor practices were substantially identical and emphasizing that
Congress had specifically empowered the NLRB to prevent acts of
this type, held that a state could not enjoin under its own labor statute
conduct made an unfair labor practice by federal law. That a state
might restrain conduct which the federal agency could find un-
objectionable raised a potential conflict with federal law which the
Court found intolerable. 5 The rule of the Garner case was later ex-
tended in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,16 in which the Court held
that a state could not use a restraint of trade statute to enjoin union
action which might reasonably be deemed an unfair labor practice,
and in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,17 in which it determined that
states lacked jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices even in
those instances when the NLRB refused to act because of its self-
imposed jurisdictional limitations.'$ By the latter decision the Garner
rule was extended to create a "no-man's land" of labor relations.
The doctrine of pre-emption is not, however, all inclusive. Even in
Garner the Court noted that the Taft-Hartley Act left some powers
to the states and did not indicate that Congress intended to deprive
the states of their traditional police and criminal jurisdiction. De-
spite the scope of federal labor legislation, the Court has consistently
held that states may prevent violence, destruction of property, or
obstruction of public streets and highways even where an unfair
labor practice is involved.20 Thus, mass picketing and related ac-
tivities can be regulated by the states under their police powers as
well as by the NLRB. Furthermore, the Court decided in United
15. 346 U.S. at 488-91, 498.
16. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
17. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
18. Although Congress, in giving the NLRB power to prevent anyone from
engaging in an unfair labor practice, intended to exhaust its powers under the
commerce clause, see definition of the term "affecting commerce" in the Taft-
Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1952), the Board has
refused to exercise its full jurisdiction and has imposed upon itself certain juris-
dictional limits. See 26 L.R.R.M. 50 (1950); 34 L.R.R.M. 75 (1954); 39 L.R.R.M.
44 (1957); 42 L.R.R.M. 89 (1958). The Supreme Court has never ruled directly
on the validity of the Board's refusal to fully exercise its powers.
19. 346 U.S. at 489.
20. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Automobile
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Allen-
Bradley Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
A state also has jurisdiction over matters outside the scope of federal labor
legislation. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Ed., 336 U.S. 301 (1949); International Union, United Automobile Workers, AFL
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Ed., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
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Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.21 that a state could
award damages against a labor union in a tort action despite the fact
that the conduct complained of was an unfair labor practice. In that
case a contractor, who had been driven by coercion and threats of
violence from the "territory" of defendant union after he refused to
force his employees to join that organization, was awarded compen-
satory and punitive damages for the union's wrongful interference
with his contractual relations. However, the presence of violence
and the fact that the NLRB afforded a person in complainant's posi-
tion no relief2 2 left three questions unanswered by the Laburnum
case. Was jurisdiction of the state court affirmed merely as another
manifestation of those previous decisions in which the Court estab-
lished that states could restrain violent and coercive unfair labor
practices which threatened the public peace? Was the award of dam-
ages upheld only because Laburnum could have obtained no relief if
state jurisdiction was denied? Or did the Laburnum case simply, and
broadly, hold that the Taft-Hartley Act did not exclude states from
awarding damages to the person injured by the tortious conduct of a
labor union even though that conduct was also an unfair labor prac-
tice? These questions were debated 23 and remained unanswered until
the Gonzales and Russell decisions indicated that the broad rule was
the one established. In each case there was the possibility that the
NLRB could have afforded some relief to the injured person, insofar
as that agency is empowered to award back pay to an employee who
21. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
22. The NLRB has no power to award damages to an employer injured by an
unfair labor practice. See 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952). Since
Laburnum had withdrawn from the contract, he no longer had an interest which
could be protected by an injunction.
23. Several states have not limited jurisdiction to award damages to situations
involving violence. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 62 (9th
Cir. 1956) ; International Sound Technicians v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. App. 2d
23, 296 P.2d 395 (1956); Denver Bldg. & Constr. Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187,
287 P.2d 267 (1955); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Damino, 146 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup.
Ct. 1955); Benjamin v. Foidl, 379 Pa. 540, 109 A.2d 300 (1954); Dallas Gen.
Drivers v. Wamix, Inc., 281 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). Various writers,
however, have regarded violence as the primary jurisdictional fact in the La-
burnum case. See Bernstein, Complement or Conflict: Federal Jurisdiction in
Labor Management Relations, 3 How. L.J. 191, 214 (1957); Isaacson, Labor
Relations Law: Federal versus State Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.A.J. 415, 419 (1956);
Isaacson, Federal Pre-emption under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 Ind. & Lab. Rel.
Rev. 391, 396 (1958); Note, LMRA Held Not to Pre-Empt Jurisdiction to Grant
Damages for Common Law Torts Involving Violence, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1147
(1954).
For general discussion of the significance of the Laburnum decision see Gar-
mon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473, 486-88
(1958) (dissenting opinion) ; Wollett, Taft-Hartley and State Power to Regulate
Labor Relations, 30 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 5-9 (1955).
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has been prevented from working by an unfair labor practice.24 In
neither case did the Court rely on the presence or absence of violence
or coercive union conduct as the basis for its decision. Rather, in
both decisions the Court relied on Laburnum to establish the broad
proposition that, regardless of the availability of partial relief from
the NLRB and regardless of whether or not the state could enjoin
under its police power the conduct complained of, there is no indi-
cation that Congress intended by the Taft-Hartley Act to pre-empt
state jurisdiction to award damages to the person injured by tortious
union action merely because it happens to be an unfair labor practice.2z
This is not to suggest that federal labor legislation may be disre-
garded in determining whether a state court has jurisdiction over
particular union conduct. It is obvious that a state may not by an
award of damages, or otherwise, interfere with rights protected by
the Taft-Hartley Act.23 Thus, before a state may exercise jurisdiction
over a labor union in a suit for damages, it must determine that the
acts complained of are not protected by federal law. Because in most
instances it would appear that conduct not protected by the Taft-
Hartley Act is proscribed by it,27 the jurisdictional prerequisite to an
award of damages will generally be a decision by the state court, at
least by inference, that the union is guilty of an unfair labor practice.
This tacit acknowledgment of the Court which was involved in
holding that a state court has jurisdiction to award damages for the
wrongful conduct of a labor union might appear inconsistent with
the result reached in the Garner decision. The effect of that case was
to withdraw from the states the power to decide whether given con-
duct was an unfair labor practice.28 It would seem that what was
denied the states in the former decision was returned in the principal
cases. On analysis, however, the apparent inconsistency is resolved.
The power to make this decision was withdrawn from the states in
Garner not merely because the states and the federal agency might
24. See note 5 supra.
25. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621 (1958);
International Union, United Automobile Workers (UAW-CIO) v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634, 646 (1958).
26. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act
defines the rights of employees protected by that statute. See 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
27. Although there is a third classification of union conduct under federal
law, i.e., that which is neither protected nor proscribed, but is unregulated by
the Taft-Hartley Act, see International Union, United Automobile Workers,
AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949), it would
seem likely that most union conduct complained of in tort actions for damages
would not fit into this third category.
28. See Isaacson, Federal Pre-emption under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 Ind. &
Lab. Rel. Rev. 391, 395 (1958).
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disagree as to what constitutes an unfair labor practice, but because
of the possibility that, having reached an opposite conclusion, a state
might enjoin conduct which the NLRB would leave undisturbed.'
This was the "conflict of remedies" of which the Court spoke.30 What
the principal cases say in effect is that there is no objection to a
state deciding that given acts constitute an unfair labor practice in
an action where the remedy sought is one which the NLRB has no
power to grant. The Court has in these cases drawn a distinction
between a remedy which is aimed at controlling unfair labor practices
and a remedy which has as its primary purpose compensation for
improper union conduct.
There remains to be considered the significance of the principal
cases in terms of the basic question they pose, i.e., whether union
unfair labor practices can now be restrained by bringing damage
suits in state courts. Since Guss v. Utah Labor Relations BdA1 pre-
vents employers who are too small to come within the jurisdictional
limitations of the NLRB from enjoining this union conduct, these
decisions will no doubt encourage small employers to pursue damage
actions as a substitute for the remedy they have been denied.3 2 What
the attitude of the Supreme Court to this anticipated development
will be is difficult to predict. A broad reading of the Court's decision
in Garner would suggest that any attempt to directly control improper
union action by a state award of damages is pre-empted by federal
law, since that is the function of the NLRB. However, by its affirm-
ance of punitive damages in Russell and Laburnum, the Court has
already indicated that it is unwilling to draw a distinction between
damages which compensate and those which seek to punish and there-
fore control future union conduct.3 3 It might appear that "conflict
29. Garner v. Teamsters Union (AFL), 346 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1953).
30. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 665
(1954).
31. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
32. Since the Laburnum case, employers have in several instances sought
damages for injury caused by improper union conduct. See Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955); United
Constr. Workers v. New Burnside Veneer Co., 274 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1955);
Selchow & Righter Co. v. Damino, 146 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Benjamin
v. Foidl, 379 Pa. 540, 109 A.2d 300 (1954); Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers
Union, 380 Pa. 3, 109 A.2d 815 (1954); Baumgartner's Electric Constr. Co. v.
DeVries, 91 N.W.2d 663 (S.D. 1958); Dallas Gen. Drivers v. Wamix, Inc., 281
SW.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
33. There was no mention of punitive damages in the Laburnum case and in
the Russell case the Court gave little credit to the assertion that a distinction
should be drawn between compensatory and punitive damages for the purpose of
determining jurisdiction. See 356 U.S. at 646. But see dissenting opinion in
Russell to the effect that punitive damages are a serious restraint on union
conduct. 356 U.S. at 652.
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of remedies" is to be read to its full extent and that the Court is not
concerned with the inherent clash between the broad rationale of the
Garner decision and an award of punitive damages. But, despite the
inference that the Court is concerned only with preventing an iden-
tical state and federal remedy from bearing on the same conduct, it
is suggested that where the purposes of federal and state action are
fundamentally the same there is an inherent conflict with federal
labor legislation regardless of the form of the remedies involved.34 In
this respect, the Court's affirmance of punitive damages in the La-
burn u and Russell decisions may indicate nothing more than its
willingness to distinguish between punitive and compensatory dam-
ages for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.
A definite answer to the question posed by the principal cases may
be given when the Supreme Court renders a decision in Stn Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garrnon/f now before it a second time.3 In
that case a California court issued an injunction and awarded dam-
ages against a labor union which picketed for recognition and to force
the employer to enter into a union shop contract. The picketing was
carried on without violence, but, because the union represented only
a small portion of Garmon's employees, it could reasonably have been
considered an unfair labor practice.37 The Supreme Court reversed
the injunction and remanded the award of damages for further con-
sideration." On remand the state court, noting that it had to decide
whether damages were authorized under California law for this par-
ticular conduct, held that the union violated a state labor statute, that
this violation constituted a tort, and thereby affirmed.3 9 It is the basis
by which union action was declared wrongful that presents the Su-
preme Court with the question of whether damage suits can be em-
ployed to control union conduct. Since the activity complained of
could be an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act, the
question, stated directly, is whether a state, by finding a violation of
its labor statute, may determine that an unfair labor practice is a
tort for the purpose of awarding damages. To answer this question
34. In those cases in which state action over an unfair labor practice has been
upheld by the Court the purpose of state action was not to control union conduct.
See, e.g., United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Labor Relations Bd., 351 U.S.
266 (1956) (maintain public safety and remove obstructions from the streets);
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (com-
pensation for injuries suffered). In these cases the form of remedy was not
material to the Court's affirmance of jurisdiction.
3-. 49 Cal. 2d ,595, 320 P.2d 473, cert. granted, 357 U.S. 925 (1958).
36. The first decision was reported at 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
37. See § 8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1 8(b) (1) (A) (1952).
38. 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
39. 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
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in the affirmative would mean that a state can accomplish by indirec-
tion the result which the Garner decision precluded it from attempt-
ing directly. The Court in the principal cases did not go to this ex-
treme. In Russell and Gonzales it said in effect that a union which
has committed a tort, as defined by laws of general application, may
be sued for damages despite the fact that the conduct was also an
unfair labor practice. Basic to the Court's reasoning was the con-
clusion that Congress had not clearly indicated an intention to pre-
empt traditional state power to award damages for wrongful conduct
simply because the wrongdoer was a labor union.40 To affirm the
California decision in the Garmon case the Court would have to extend
these propositions to read that a state has jurisdiction to award dam-
ages solely because an unfair labor practice was committed and the
wrongdoer was a labor union. At least by indirection, this would
allow states to control union conduct. Since the broad holding of
Garner appears to be that a state lacks jurisdiction to exercise this
control, it is believed that the decision of the California court will
be reversed.41
40. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621 (1958);
International Union, United Automobile Workers (UAW-CIO) v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634, 646 (1958). See also United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 669 (1954).
41. Assuming the Garmon case will be reversed on the above reasoning, the
question would be presented of whether or not a state's jurisdiction to award
damages to one injured by union conduct would extend to include conduct found
to be tortious under the prima facie tort theory rather than under one of the
cognate torts of interference with contractual relations or interference with
lawful occupation. In some states, the intentional infliction of injury upon an-
other without justification is actionable as a prima facie tort. See Forkosch, An
Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 Cornell L.Q. 465 (1957) ;
Note, Recent Developments in the New York Law of Prima Facie Tort, 32 St.
John's L. Rev. 282 (1958). E.g., in Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 124
N.E.2d 104 (1954), an employer brought an action for damages against a labor
union under a theory of prima facie tort.
A "prima facie tort" would certainly be a tort of general application, and
would not necessarily impose liability solely on the ground that the union's con-
duct constituted an unfair labor practice; thus, objections which may be found
to the holding of the California court in the Garmon case would be overcome.
Such a theory might, however, be employed primarily to prevent unfair labor
practices, in which event the problem of a conflict between federal labor policy
and state policy effectuated by damage suits would be presented. See note 34
supra and text supported thereby. It is suggested that should the Court find that
this conflict was presented, it would hold that the state lacked jurisdiction to
award damages in such actions.
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